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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, Internet gambling has become a global
force. In 2003, the projected industry revenues summed five billion
dollars worldwide.' With the click of a button, bettors could link up
with counterparts in other parts of the globe for a poker tournament
or a game of blackjack. As other countries embraced the operators
of this new recreational activity, recognizing it as an opportunity to
spur economic growth and bring in valuable tax revenue, the United
States began to crack down on the industry.2
As part of this crackdown, the U.S. federal government and the
states started to pass and enforce regulations prohibiting Internet
gambling, resulting in the arrest and conviction of executives of
foreign gambling operations who dared to set foot on U.S. soil.3 This
onslaught against the foreign gaming industry did not go unnoticed,
however, and eventually, one small country, Antigua and Barbuda,
attempted to fight back against what it perceived as unfair discrimi-
nation against one of its primary sources of income. Antigua
brought a complaint against the United States to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), alleging violations of U.S. obligations under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).4 The WTO
found the United States to be in violation of a specific provision of
GATS and ordered the United States to bring federal law into
1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-89 INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ISSUES 1 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-89 [hereinafter
INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW].
2. See Joseph J. McBurney, Note, To Regulate or To Prohibit: An Analysis of the Internet
Gambling Industry and the Need for a Decision on the Industry's Future in the United States,
21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337, 340-45 (2006) (discussing the growth of the Internet gaming industry
abroad and U.S. opposition to the industry).
3. See Carrie Johnson, U.S. Raises Stakes for Online Gamblers; Super Sunday Is Biggest
Betting Day, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2007, at Al (noting that "the wave of criminal charges
against individual executives and businesses ... prompted a real exodus from the U.S.
market"). One U.S. Attorney has stated that "[c]riminal prosecutions related to online
gambling will be pursued even in cases where assets and defendants are positioned outside
of the United States." Id.
4. See Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, 11.2.1 (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Gambling
Panel Report].
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conformity with its GATS obligations.5 Though many scholars
consider the violation to be minor and the fix relatively uncompli-
cated,6 thus far the United States has failed to comply with the
WTO's recommendations.7
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) governs disputes,
such as this one, that arise under GATS, as well as disputes under
other WTO agreements.8 The DSU vests adjudicatory power in the
WTO for all disputes that arise under WTO agreements.9 Although
WTO member nations have failed to comply on occasion with WTO
decisions involving violations under other agreements-such as the
General Agreement on Trade in Tariffs (GATT) or Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-this lack of
compliance has not proved fatal to these agreements. 10 GATS,
however, is a fairly young multinational trade agreement, and some
scholars argue that GATS has struggled to shape its identity amidst
problems with overly flexible provisions and lack of attention from
WTO ministers." Although most countries are likely to acknowledge
that the agreement has been a relative success thus far, 2 it has yet
5. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ABfR, 373(D)(vi)(a), 374 (Apr. 7,
2005) [hereinafter Gambling Appellate Body Report].
6. See, e.g., I. Nelson Rose, U.S. Ignores Deadline in WTO Fight with Antigua, 10 GAMING
L. REV. 225, 225-26 (2006) (arguing that the WTO Appellate Body decision was a "big win" for
the United States and that compliance with the decision would require "just a little tweaking
of the Interstate Horseracing Act").
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. See World Trade Org., Dispute Settlement System Training Module ch. 4: Legal Basis
for a Dispute, § 4.4, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispuke/dispsettlement cbt-e/
c4s4pl-e.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Legal Basis for a Dispute].
9. David Evans & Celso de Tarso Pereira, DSU Review: A View from the Inside, in KEY
ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 251, 252 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce
Wilson eds., 2005).
10. See infra Parts III.D-E.
11. See Rudolf Adlung, Services Negotiations in the Doha Round: Lost in Flexibility?, 9 J.
IN'L ECON. L. 865, 865-66 (2006) ("Services have not attracted much attention in most World
Trade Organization ... Ministerial Conferences.... [Ilt became increasingly clear ... that the
absence of negotiating frictions coincided with, and might have been attributable to, an almost
complete lack of commercially meaningful substance.").
12. Juan A. Marchetti & Petros C. Mavroidis, What Are the Main Challenges for the GATS
Framework? Don't Talk About Revolution, 5 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 511, 524 (2004) ("[T]he
WTO membership does not seem to be discontent with the GATS architecture.... [Flor the
time being at least, there is widespread belief among institutional players (the WTO
Members) that the GATS is a satisfactory compromise.").
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to weather any serious tests to its legitimacy. Because it was
instrumental in the formation of GATS, a other countries will likely
look to the United States as an example when deciding whether to
comply with WTO decisions under GATS.
The outcome of the gambling dispute may prove to be a bell-
wether for the success or failure of the agreement as a mechanism
for regulating trade in services. This Note argues that if the United
States fails to respond appropriately to the recommendations made
by the WTO, the legitimacy of GATS as a mechanism for regulating
trade in services disputes will be undermined. Without legitimacy,
GATS becomes nothing more than symbolic lip service to the
importance of liberalization in the service trade. Member nations
will perceive the agreement as a weak guarantor of rights and, as
a result, will be less likely to resort to the GATS dispute mechanism
should a service trade dispute arise. This in turn may compel WTO
members to take unilateral action to enforce their rights, leading to
elevated hostilities and possible trade wars. To avoid these devas-
tating results and to preserve GATS, the United States should adopt
the WTO recommendations proffered in the gambling dispute.
Part I provides background on the Internet gambling industry,
both in Antigua and worldwide. Part II discusses Antigua's
complaint against the United States and the WTO decision in the
gambling dispute and sets forth the basic GATS and DSU provisions
governing such a dispute. Part III considers the benefits of main-
taining a strong mechanism for resolving service trade disputes
under GATS and addresses specific compliance issues under the
DSU generally. Part IV analyzes previous compliance issues under
other WTO agreements and explains why noncompliance in the
gambling dispute, in particular, is more likely to damage the
pertinent multilateral trade agreement, GATS. Finally, this Note
argues for the United States's quick adoption of the WTO recom-
mendations in the gambling dispute to preserve the legitimacy of
GATS.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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I. THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNET GAMBLING
In 2002, the United States jailed Jay Cohen, an operator of World
Sports Exchange Ltd., for violations of a federal law14 prohibiting
the use of phone wires for gambling. 5 Cohen had based his Internet
gambling empire out of Antigua and Barbuda, a tiny island nation
in the Caribbean, and the operation accepted bets from the United
States. 6 Cohen returned to the United States voluntarily, but, once
he set foot on U.S. soil, the FBI took him into custody in an attempt
to crack down on what the United States perceived as illegal
Internet gambling."7 He received a twenty-one month sentence after
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction
on eight counts of conspiracy and substantive offenses in violation
of the federal Wire Act.'" Just before Cohen began serving his
sentence, he received a mysterious letter suggesting that the United
States might be violating its international trade commitments.' 9
Cohen notified Antigua of this possibility, and although Antigua
was reluctant to spend any of its small budget on a major legal
undertaking at the WTO, the gambling industry eventually fronted
the money on behalf of the island nation.2 °
Gambling operators and bettors alike have been focused on the
Cohen case since its inception. Internet gambling has enjoyed an
explosion of popularity over the past decade and has evolved from
an enjoyable pastime into a multimillion-dollar industry.2' By 1995,
the first Internet gambling sites were up and running.22 Seven years
later, about 1800 gambling websites existed.23 These websites' oper-
14. Cohen was indicted under the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000), which prohibits the
knowing use of wire communication to transmit bets or information that assists in placing
bets on sporting events or contests.
15. Paul Blustein, Against All Odds; Antigua Besting U.S. in Internet Gambling Case at
WTO, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at D1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. § 1084; see United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the judgment
of the district court sentencing Cohen to a term of twenty-one months in prison).
19. Blustein, supra note 15.
20. Id.
21. See INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 1.
22. McBurney, supra note 2, at 339.
23. See INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 1.
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ators often flocked to smaller countries that were willing to loosen
regulations on gambling operators in exchange for the industry's
attendant economic prosperity.
2 4
Antigua and Barbuda was among the first countries to allow
gambling companies to locate on its shores. Initially Antigua
permitted the operators to accept foreign bets without paying
taxes,25 and by 1999, the tiny island nation hosted 119 operators.26
Antigua's only form of regulation was required licensing fees, which
created revenue. 27 The gambling companies also provided a boost to
the local economy through the creation of jobs. At its peak, the
gambling industry provided around 10 percent of Antigua's gross
domestic product.28
Although the gambling industry on Antigua began virtually
unregulated, requiring only a licensing fee, by 2001 the country
had set up a Gaming Directorate to oversee the industry and had
improved regulations to better protect players and reduce financial
fraud.29 Antigua made this shift in response to U.S. concerns about
unregulated Internet gambling. The move proved costly, however,
and by 2003 the number of operators on Antigua dropped to only
twenty-eight, which in turn negatively affected the job market and
licensing revenue.3 ° More than 3,000 Antiguans, or about 10 percent
of the total workforce, found themselves jobless after the U.S.
crackdown on Internet gambling."'
24. See Anthony N. Cabot & Robert D. Faiss, Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era, 5
CHAP. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2002); Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in
Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1570-71 (1999).
25. Joseph M. Kelly, Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 128 (2000).
26. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, 3.5.
27. Kelly, supra note 25, at 128.
28. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, 3.5.
29. Id. 3.5-3.6.
30. Id. 3.5.
31. Carol J. Williams, High Stakes for Antigua in Fight for Web Gaming, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2006, at C1.
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II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS)
A. Antigua Fights Back
Antigua's complaint to the WTO alleged that the United States's
ban on "remote-access" international gambling and restrictions on
international payments for such services were inconsistent with
U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)." Antigua alleged that those obligations required the
United States to allow other member nations equal access to its
domestic gambling and betting markets.33
In the complaint, Antigua also contended that the drastic
reduction in licensed gaming operators on the island was due
primarily to both "the increased standards of regulation," which
drove some operators to seek out countries with more relaxed
standards of operation, and to the "increasingly aggressive strategy
on the part of the United States to impede the operation of cross-
border gaming activities in Antigua."34 As examples of such a
strategy, Antigua pointed to the restrictions on international
transfers and payments for gambling services in the United States,35
and to the fact that the U.S. government permits local and regional
32. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, 9 2.1. Specifically, Antigua alleged that U.S.
measures were inconsistent with its Schedule of specific commitments under GATS, in which
the United States committed to the open exchange of "[o]ther recreational services (except
sporting)," and with GATS Articles XVI:1-2, which deal with market access commitments;
XVII:1-3, which deal with national treatment commitments; VI:1-3, which provide for the
reasonable and objective administration of domestic regulations affecting trade in services;
and XI:I, which prohibits restrictions on payments and transfers for transactions relating to
a member's specific commitments. Id. 9 2.1, 3.30.
33. Id. 9 2.1, 3.221-.224.
34. Id. 3.5.
35. The federal laws at issue included the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000), prohibiting
the knowing use of wire communication to transmit bets or information that assists in placing
bets on sporting events or contests; the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000), criminalizing the
distribution of the proceeds of illegal activities like gambling; and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000), criminalizing the operation of a gambling business that
violates the laws of the state in which the gambling occurs.
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authorities to allow many different types of gambling services while
simultaneously excluding foreign providers of those same services.8
B. Basic Provisions of GATS
Because Antigua's complaint dealt with Internet gambling, which
is considered a service, the dispute fell under the purview of GATS.
GATS was enacted in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round of
WTO negotiations.3 7 Its stated purpose is to "establish a multilateral
framework of principles and rules for trade in services with a view
to expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and
progressive liberalization" and to "promot[e] the economic growth of
all trading partners and the development of developing countries.""
GATS includes both general obligations, which apply to all
member countries, and a schedule of sector-specific commitments,
which are commitments by individual members with regard to a
specific service area.39 As part of the general obligations, GATS
mandates most-favored-nation treatment among its members. This
provision requires that each member treat the services and service
suppliers of other members as favorably as it treats those of any
other country.4" The general obligations also provide for transpar-
ency among member nations with regard to relevant measures
relating to services.41 Furthermore, a member is required to provide
36. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, at Annex D. The state constitutions and laws
involved in Antigua's complaint were: N.J. CONST. art. 4, § VII, para. 2; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §
9; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-10-103 (2006); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (2006); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 271, § 17A (LexisNexis 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.75, 609.755(1) (West 2006);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2A:40-1 (2006); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-401 (McKinney 2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-25A-1 to -15 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102 (2006). Gambling
Panel Report, supra note 4, 7.1.
37. The General Agreement on Trade in Services: An Introduction 1 (2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv-e/serv-e.htm [hereinafter Introduction to GATS]
(follow "Introduction to GATS" hyperlink under "Introduction to Services Trade and the WTO
Agreement").
38. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; see also Introduction to
GATS, supra note 37, § 1.2.
39. GATS, supra note 38, at 1169-80.
40. Id. at 1169.
41. Id. at 1170.
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market access to all other members in the sectors specified in its
Schedule.42
The provision of GATS most relevant to the gambling dispute
relates to national treatment. Members are prohibited from
according domestic services and service suppliers more favorable
treatment than accorded to other members in the sectors specified
in their Schedules. 43 The primary thrust of Antigua's complaint
against the United States was that the United States was not
abiding by its commitment to treat both foreign and domestic
gambling operators equally." Antigua noted that each nation's
Schedule of specific commitments was voluntarily adopted, and if
the United States had wanted to exclude gambling and betting
services from its general obligations under GATS, such as was done
for national treatment and market access commitments, it simply
had to say so. 4
5
C. Remedies Available Under the Dispute Settlement Framework
To resolve violations of GATS commitments, such as those alleged
by Antigua against the United States, GATS member nations must
appeal to remedies available through the WTO, whose power to
resolve disputes under GATS is somewhat limited. The framework
setting forth the procedure to address disputes under GATS is
embodied in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).46 The
DSU was adopted after the Uruguay Round as "a single compulsory
mechanism of dispute settlement for all WTO agreements. 47 Under
the DSU, the parties to a complaint must first engage in consulta-
tions to try and find "a mutually agreed solution. 48 If the consulta-
tions fail to resolve the dispute, the complainant has recourse to the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for adjudication.
42. Id. at 1179.
43. Id. at 1180.
44. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, 2.1.
45. Id. 3.30-.70.
46. See Legal Basis for a Dispute, supra note 8.
47. Evans & Pereira, supra note 9, at 252.
48. World Trade Org., Dispute Settlement System Training Module ch. 6: The
Process-Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, § 6.1, http:www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/disp-settlement cbt.e/c6slpl-e.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter DSU Process].
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The DSB consists of a Dispute Panel and, if necessary, an
Appellate Body.49 The remedies available at the DSB level are
limited to settlement, withdrawal of the measure, compensation,
and retaliation.5" When a nation takes an action that is inconsistent
with its agreements under GATS, the Dispute Panel and Appellate
Body may recommend that the nation come into conformity with its
obligations and suggest ways to do so, but these bodies cannot add
to or take away from a member's commitments or rights."1 For
example, the Dispute Panel may not unilaterally eliminate a
particular commitment under a nation's Schedule of specific com-
mitments. If, after the DSB has made a recommendation, the
offending member fails to bring itself into conformity with its GATS
agreements, only then may the Dispute Panel and Appellate Body
authorize countermeasures, such as compensation by the offending
nation to the complainant, or retaliation, which usually takes the
form of countermeasures such as the suspension of the offender's
concessions under GATS"
D. Outcome of Antigua's Complaint
Antigua initiated its dispute in 2003 by requesting consultations
with the United States, as required by the GATS dispute settlement
framework.53 The United States and Antigua, however, were unable
to reach a satisfactory conclusion during the consultation phase of
the proceedings.54 When consultations in the gambling dispute
failed to produce a result, Antigua requested that the DSB establish
49. Id.
50. World Trade Org., Dispute Settlement System Training Module ch. 7: Legal Effect of
Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and Rulings, § 7.1,
http://www.wto.orgenglishltratop-e/dispu-e/disp-settlement-cbte/c7slple. htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Legal Effect].
51. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1237 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
52. Legal Effect, supra note 50.
53. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT[DS285/1, S/L110
(Mar. 27, 2003); see supra Part II.C.
54. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/18 (July 7, 2006).
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a panel on July 12, 2003,"5 and the DSB established such a panel on
July 21, 2003.56
After considering Antigua's complaint, the Dispute Panel largely
agreed with Antigua, finding that gambling and betting services
did indeed fall under the purview of U.S.-specific commitments
involving "other betting services."57 Because gambling and betting
services were included in its Schedule, the United States was
required to allow equal access to foreign providers of such
services pursuant to the national treatment provision of GATS.5"
Additionally, the Panel found that the United States had violated
Article XVI of GATS, the market access provision,59 with respect to
certain federal and state laws.6 °
The United States made clear that if this decision withstood
appeal, it had no intention of bringing its laws into conformity with
the Panel's recommendations. A senior U.S. trade official described
the Panel Report as 'ludicrous," 61 and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative released a statement describing the decision as
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, 7.2(a).
58. Id. 7.2(b).
59. Article XVI of GATS, the market access provision, reads: "With respect to market
access through the modes of supply identified in Article I, each Member shall accord services
and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that provided
for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule." GATS,
supra note 38, at 1179. The provision goes on to explain the specific types of measures that
a member is not allowed to maintain in sectors where market access commitments are
undertaken, including numerical quotas, monopolies or other limits on the number of service
suppliers, the total value of service transactions, the total number of service operations, or the
total number employed in that sector. Id. Prohibitions on limits are also placed "on the
participation of foreign capital ... or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign
investment" in a particular sector. Id.
60. Gambling Panel Report, supra note 4, 7.2. The laws found to be in violation included
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, when read together with
certain state laws, as well as the state gambling laws of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South
Dakota, and Utah. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 271, § 17A
(2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-25A-8 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102(b) (2006).
61. William New, E-Commerce: U.S. Outraged at "Ludicrous" WTO E-Gambling Decision,
NAT'L JOURNAL'S TECH. DAILY (Nov. 10, 2004) (on file with author).
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"deeply flawed. 62 This was the first time in WTO history that the
United States took such a contrary position to a DSB finding.63
Fortunately for the United States, the Appellate Body rejected
much of the Panel's findings on appeal. The Appellate Body agreed
that the United States's Schedule included commitments about
gambling and betting services, but found that the Panel had erred
in examining whether state laws were consistent with GATS.64 The
Appellate Body also found that the federal laws at issue were
"necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order"6
and, as such, were exceptions to U.S. commitments under GATS."6
The only finding of noncompliance occurred with respect to the
Interstate Horseracing Act (1HA), which the Appellate Body found
discriminated between "foreign and domestic service suppliers of
remote betting services for horse racing."67 The IHA permits off-
track pari-mutuel betting via telephone or electronic media if the
bet is both sent from and received in a state where such betting is
legal.6" The Appellate Body then recommended that the United
States bring the IHA into conformity with its GATS agreements.6 9
After the ruling, an arbitrator set April 3, 2006, as a reasonable
deadline for the United States to comply legislatively with the
Appellate Body's recommendations.7" This deadline passed, how-
ever, without a response from the United States.71 A week later, the
62. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of Richard Mills,
USTR Spokesman, Regarding the WTO Gambling Dispute with Antigua and Barbuda (Nov.
10, 2004), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2004/101104gambling.htm ("[Tihe
Clinton Administration clearly intended to exclude gambling from U.S. services
commitments.... [I]t defies common sense that the United States would make a commitment
to let international gambling operate within our borders.").
63. John Magnus, Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions: Is There a Crisis?,
in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 242, 243 & n.2 (Rufus
Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005).
64. Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, 373(A)(iii), 373(B).
65. Id. 373(D)(iii)(c).
66. GATS, supra note 38, at 1177 (providing that nothing in GATS prevents any Member
from maintaining measures necessary to ensure public morals and order).
67. Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, 373(D)(vi)(a).
68. Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3001-07 (2000).
69. Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, 1 374.
70. Arbitration Under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Dispute, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/13, 68 (Aug. 19, 2005).
71. Rose, supra note 6, at 226.
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United States submitted a report to the WTO stating that it
believed that the IHA was already in compliance with U.S. obliga-
tions under GATS.72 Dissatisfied with this response, Antigua
requested the establishment of a panel to determine whether the
United States had in fact complied with the DSB recommenda-
tions. 73 The Panel concluded that the United States "failed to comply
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. 74
Pursuant to this ruling, Antigua applied to suspend concessions
under GATS to the United States at a level that would match the
"nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Antigua and
Barbuda, amounting to an annual value of US$3.443 billion, as a
result of the United State's failure ... to bring its measures affecting
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services into
compliance with the GATS .... ,"5 The United States has requested
arbitration as to the level of suspension of concessions and obliga-
tions under GATS that Antigua has called for,76 but this arbitration
has not yet taken place.77
III. COMPLIANCE UNDER THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
FRAMEWORK
A. Benefits of a Strong Agreement for Regulation of Trade in
Services
The U.S. response to the gambling dispute with Antigua threat-
ens to undermine the process through which rights and obligations
72. Request for the Establishment of a Panel By Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 54.
73. Id.
74. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda-Report of the Panel,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/RW, 7.1 (Mar. 30, 2007).
75. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007).
76. Request by the United States for Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT[DS285/23 (July 24, 2007).
77. See Recourse by the United States to Article 22.6 of the DSU-Note by the Secretariat,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/24 (Aug. 6, 2007).
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under GATS are enforced internationally. Maintaining a legitimate
mechanism for regulating the service trade is important for a
number of reasons. First, GATS aims at removing restrictions to
international trade in services. Such liberalization increases
economic growth and efficiency in the markets of GATS members,
as services begin to be provided along the lines of comparative
advantage.7' Furthermore, having a centralized dispute settlement
mechanism for the services trade increases "security and predictabil-
ity" for all trade participants.79 The DSU does this by providing a
single forum for resolving all GATS disputes, which adds to the
efficiency and timeliness of outcomes and consistency in interpreta-
tion of the GATS agreement.8 " Additionally, without a legitimate
agreement under which to enforce rights and obligations, service
trade commitments become nothing more than straw men that
nations can abide by or ignore at will.8 ' Such an arrangement would
clearly disfavor weaker nations, which often lack the economic and
political clout to enforce their own rights on the open market.82
Finally, maintaining a centralized framework for regulation of the
services trade under GATS decreases the likelihood of unilateral
actions by members who believe their rights have been violated.
Unilateral actions have a tendency to escalate to the point of trade
war, with each side maintaining that its actions are justified while
simultaneously condemning similar actions by a fellow member.8 "
B. Statistics on Compliance with the DSU
Since its inception, the DSU has had considerable success as a
mechanism for resolving trade disputes under the various WTO
agreements. During the first ten years of its existence, the DSB saw
324 cases formally initiated, but only 107 of these cases resulted in
78. See Mahmood Bagheri & Chizu Nakajima, Optimal Level of Financial Regulation
Under the GATS: A Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Framework for Capital Adequacy
and Disclosure of Information, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507, 514-16 (2002).
79. LEGAL AFFAIRS DIv. & THE APPELLATE BODY, WORLD TRADE ORG., A HANDBOOK ON THE
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 2 (2004) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT].
80. See id. at 2-7.
81. See id. at 2-3.
82. See id. at 1.
83. See id. at 7.
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the creation of a panel to adjudicate the complaint. 4 The remaining
cases were either settled through the formal consultation procedure
required by the DSU or abandoned. 5 Of the 107 cases that a panel
heard and that resulted in a panel report, two-thirds were later
appealed, but only one-sixth led to the formation of a compliance
panel.86 These statistics reveal that, in general, the dispute settle-
ment framework has been successful in resolving trade disputes
under the WTO.
One scholar has pointed to three reasons why most nations
comply with WTO mandates. These include the desire to maintain
one's reputation as a member nation that adheres to its WTO
agreements, fear of retaliation authorized by the WTO dispute
settlement bodies, and fear of encouraging noncompliance by other
member nations in future WTO disputes. Larger member nations
are afraid that setting an example of noncompliance will create a
negative stigma and lead to distrust in future bargaining. Smaller
members, already burdened with the high cost of litigating a
dispute under the DSU, cannot afford to suffer economic sanctions
or suspension of concessions from larger, more robust countries.
C. Problems with Compliance
Despite the WTO's success in resolving trade disputes, some
roadblocks have existed along the road toward achieving compli-
ance. One of the major problems with the DSU is that although the
WTO self-describes its decisions as binding upon member nations,8
at the end of the day these decisions are still merely recommenda-
tions. The WTO contends that usage of the term "recommendation"
"should not be understood to give the party discretion as to whether
84. Bruce Wilson, The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation: A Brief
Overview of the First Ten Years, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS, supra note 9, at 15, 20-21.
85. William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 17, 46 (2005); Wilson, supra note 84, at 20-21.
86. Wilson, supra note 84, at 21.
87. Magnus, supra note 63, at 244-45.
88. HANDBOOK ON WTO DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, supra note 79, at 88 ("After the DSB
adopts a report of a panel (and the Appellate Body), the conclusions and recommendations
contained in that report become binding upon the parties to the dispute.").
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to follow the recommendation." 9 As one scholar has noted, however,
"the verb 'to recommend' is less coercive than 'to order' or 'to
require', but more compulsive than 'to suggest', 'to note', or 'to
observe'."9 ° The WTO bodies therefore may construct remedies that
are highly persuasive, but difficult to enforce nonetheless.
Because the WTO has no means of forcing countries to adhere to
its recommendations, it has relied primarily on voluntary compli-
ance with its decisions by member nations. As noted, this voluntary
system has worked in a majority of disputes, even those involving
the United States.9 In general, the United States has been compli-
ant in cases that required only administrative action to implement
the recommendations of the DSB.92 Between 1995 and 2004, the
United States was the most active participant in dispute settlement,
litigating as the respondent in fifty-seven disputes and participating
thirty-nine times in cases that were appealed to the Appellate
Body.93 Out of those disputes that ended adversely for the United
States and required only an administrative solution, the United
States complied in twenty cases.94 Yet, when legislative action has
been necessary to bring U.S. measures into compliance, adversaries
have faced an uphill battle to achieve their desired result. Congress
first consented to passing remedial legislation in any WTO dispute
in 2004, nearly ten years after the implementation of the current
dispute settlement framework.95
89. Id.
90. Chi Carmody, Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 307, 316 (2002).
91. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. The United States contends that its
overall compliance with WTO rulings is good. Magnus, supra note 63, at 244 n.5 (quoting
Statement by the U.S. Representative at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
Geneva (Feb. 17, 2005)).
92. Wilson, supra note 84, at 21.
93. KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 9, at
Annex III, IV.
94. Wilson, supra note 84, at 23.
95. Id. The United States finally passed remedial legislation in 2004 for the U.S.-FSC
dispute, one notorious example of U.S. noncompliance. Id.
In the U.S.-FSC dispute, the European Community contended that certain sections of the
U.S. tax code establishing special treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations were inconsistent
with GATT. After the dispute was decided by the DSB, the WTO found that the steps taken
by the United States to comply with WTO recommendations did not fully implement the
ruling. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, United
States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/RW, 256 (Jan. 14,
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D. Specific Issues with U.S. Compliance
A number of cases are still pending in which the United States
has failed to bring itself into compliance with a WTO ruling. These
cases include U.S.-Section 110(5)(b) Copyright Act; U.S.-Section
211 Appropriation Act; U.S.-Hot-Rolled Steel; U.S.-Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment); and, of course, the instant case regarding
Internet gambling.96 Notably, each of these cases requires a
legislative fix to achieve compliance.
1. U.S.-Byrd Amendment Dispute
The Byrd Amendment dispute is one of the most often-cited
examples of U.S. reluctance to comply with a DSB recommendation.
In this dispute, a number of countries initiated a complaint with
the DSB with regard to the Byrd Amendment to the U.S. Offset
Act;9  the Amendment provided that domestic producers who
supported petitions to investigate antidumping or countervailing
duty violations could receive part of the duties imposed as a
result of the investigations.9" The complainants asserted that the
Amendment violated U.S. obligations under GATT 1994 and other
WTO agreements, and the Appellate Body report, issued in 2003,
largely agreed.99 The United States failed to bring the Act into
conformity with its obligations within the reasonable period of
time set by the DSB, however, and retaliatory sanctions were
authorized.' 0 It was not until early 2006 that Congress approved
2002). A disagreement ensued over whether the United States had complied, eventually
resulting in the United States enacting new legislation in 2004, but the EC is also debating
whether this new legislation brings the United States into compliance. See Second Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, United States-Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations" WT/DS108/AB/RW2 (Feb. 13, 2006).
96. Magnus, supra note 63, at 243-48.
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2000).
98. Bryan Mercurio, The Australian Contribution to the Jurisprudence of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process, 12 CURRENTS: IN'L TRADE L.J. 43, 50-51 (2003) (explaining that Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Community, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and
Thailand all requested the establishment of a panel in the antidumping dispute).
99. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
of 2000, WTfDS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, 318 (Jan. 16, 2003).
100. Summary of the Dispute to Date, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, http://www.wto.org/enghsh/tratope/dispu_e/casese/ds217_e.htm#
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the Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation Act, which may have
finally brought the United States into compliance with the recom-
mendations of the DSB in this dispute,10 1 subject to evaluation and
acceptance by the WTO. 102
2. U. S.-Hot-Rolled Steel Dispute
A similarly contested DSB decision occurred in the hot-rolled steel
case. The United States had imposed antidumping measures on
Japanese imports of certain hot-rolled steel products.0 3 Japan
argued that such measures violated U.S. obligations under GATT
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.' 4 Ultimately, the Appellate
Body agreed with the Panel that the U.S. measure was inconsistent
with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and ordered that the United
States bring its measures into conformity."'0 With Japan's approval,
the United States was granted a number of extensions to the
reasonable period of time in which to conform to DSB recommenda-
tions, originally from November 23, 2002 until July 31, 2005.106
Japan also agreed not to resort to the suspension of concessions or
other obligations in exchange for agreement by the United States to
continue in its efforts to achieve compliance.0 7 In its most recent
status report, however, the only offering made by the United States
was that legislation had been introduced in May of 2005 that would
summary (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
101. Status Report by the United States, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/16/Add.24, WT/DS234/24/Add.24 (Feb. 7, 2006).
102. The DSU provides that when a disagreement arises as to whether measures taken will
bring a member nation into compliance with a previous DSB recommendation, this
disagreement will be resolved by resorting to dispute settlement procedures. The DSB, often
the original dispute panel itself, will examine the measure and issue a report evaluating the
nation's compliance with its recommendations. DSU, supra note 51, at 1238.
103. Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/ABfR, 1 (Aug. 23, 2001).
104. Id. 3.
105. Id. 7 240-41.
106. Arbitration Under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/13, 40 (Feb. 19, 2002); Request for
Modification of Reasonable Period of Time by United States, United States-Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WTJDS184/18 (Aug. 3, 2004).
107. Understanding Between Japan and the United States, United States-Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/19 (July 8, 2005).
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bring the United States into conformity with DSB recommenda-
tions, and that the administration would continue to work with
Congress to pass the legislation. 1 8 The case is still pending, more
than five years after its initiation.
3. U.S.-Section 211 Dispute
In the U.S.-Section 211 Appropriations Act dispute, the
European Communities (EC) claimed that Section 211 of the
Omnibus Appropriations Act1" 9 prohibited Cuban nationals from
registering or renewing any trademarks that were confiscated as
part of the Cuban Revolution.110 The EC asserted that this measure
violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement, which also falls under the purview of the WTO
dispute settlement framework.' The Appellate Body eventually
held that certain parts of Section 211 were inconsistent with TRIPS
and ordered the United States to bring the measure into conformity
with the agreement." 2 Much like the Hot-Rolled Steel dispute, the
United States expressed its intention to conform with the DSB's
recommendations but is currently still "working with ... Congress"
to pass the appropriate legislation. 3
4. U.S.-Section 110(5)(b) Dispute
In a final example of U.S. noncompliance, in 1999 the EC alleged
violations of the TRIPS with regard to § 110(5)(b) of the United
108. Status Report by the United States, United States--Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/15/Add.46 (Sept. 18, 2006).
109. Department of Commerce Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211, 112
Stat. 2681, 88. Section 211 was incorporated as part of the larger Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
110. Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/R, 4.5-.9 (Aug. 6, 2001).
111. Id. 1.
112. Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, 360-61 (Jan. 2, 2002).
113. Status Report by the United States, United States-Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/11/Add.46 (Sept. 18, 2006).
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States Copyright Act." 4 The EC alleged that amended sections of
the Act, which exempted certain establishments below a particular
size and equipment level from paying royalties to copyright holders
when music was played,1 '5 were violations of the TRIPS duty to
protect copyright.' 6 The Panel agreed, and it ordered the United
States to pay royalties to copyright holders and bring the measure
into conformity with TRIPS."' The United States made the royalty
payments, but, as in the above three disputes, Congress has yet to
pass legislation to amend the noncompliant sections of the Act.1
18
E. Differentiating Between Previous Instances of U.S.
Noncompliance and the Internet Gambling Dispute
Scholars have offered a number of reasons to explain these
glaring examples of U.S. noncompliance. For example, the United
States often engages in a balancing test with regard to implement-
ing the recommendations of the DSB. 19 If the United States values
retention of the noncompliant measure more highly than it fears
paying compensation to, or suffering retaliation from, the victor in
a WTO dispute, then it may choose to disregard DSB recommenda-
tions.'2 ° Furthermore, on occasion, the United States has either
disagreed with the decision put forth by WTO dispute settlement
bodies or has lacked enough information about the trade effects of
compliance to make a decision about whether to adopt the recom-
mendations. 21
Concerns about abuse of the WTO dispute settlement system may
also hinder compliance. In a few instances, complaints have been
brought that would have little effect on trade no matter what the
outcome, thus serving only to tie up member nations in expensive
114. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTDS1601R,
1.1 (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Copyright Panel Report].
115. Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
116. Copyright Panel Report, supra note 114, 3.1.
117. Id. 7.1.
118. Status Report by the United States, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/24/Add.23 (Nov. 10, 2006).
119. Magnus, supra note 63, at 245-46.
120. Id. at 245.
121. Id.
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and time-consuming litigation. Refusal to adopt a measure that the
United States sees as an abuse of the system may be nothing more
than a symbolic gesture to other members. 122 Finally, the United
States has a history of front-loading its compliance, meaning that
when it signs an international agreement, such as those that arose
out of the Uruguay Round, it will make all the legislative changes
it sees fit in order to come into compliance before the agreement
takes effect. 123 Therefore, later findings of noncompliance are
sometimes viewed with skepticism, as all domestic laws have been
scrutinized previously and evaluated as to their consistency with
U.S. commitments.
1 24
One or more of these factors is present in each of the disputes
that is pending. Yet, even in the most hard-fought cases, including
those discussed above, 25 the United States has always announced
its intent to comply with DSB rulings and honor its obligations
under WTO agreements. 26 Such was not the case following the
initial Panel report released in the gambling dispute.
Furthermore, unlike other WTO agreements, GATS is not battle
tested. At this point, a single instance of noncompliance under
GATT is merely an unfortunate statistic, not a crisis. Additionally,
a number of disputes have already been resolved under the terms
of TRIPS, an agreement of the same age as GATS. 27 Cases continue
to be brought to the WTO involving the agreements implicated in
the four examples of U.S. compliance problems, suggesting that
member nations continue to trust that those agreements are
established enough to continue to protect their rights. 28 The
122. Id. at 245 & n.6.
123. Id. at 245-46 & n.6.
124. Id. at 245-46.
125. See supra Parts III.D.1-4.
126. Magnus, supra note 63, at 243.
127. See Mariko Kunimi, TRIPS Agreement, Is It Really Successful Achievement in the
WTO?, 3 OR. REV. INT'L L. 46, 50 (2001) ("The 16 disputes of TRIPS concern 12 different
matters. Of the total, eight have been resolved.").
128. Since the U.S. compliance problems under TRIPS, Australia and the United States
have both requested consultations in separate disputes involving that agreement. See, e.g.,
Request to Join Consultations, European Communities-Protection of Trademark
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/6 (May 1,
2003); Request for Consultations by Australia, European Communities-Protection of
Trademark Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT[DS290/1
(Apr. 23, 2003). Additionally, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, one of the most notorious
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substantive commitments made under GATS, however, have yet to
weather the same storm of compliance disputes that strengthened
agreements like GATT and TRIPS. The U.S. response in the
gambling dispute is therefore more influential than in disputes
under other WTO agreements, because noncompliance will set the
tone for how seriously member nations intend to take their GATS
obligations.
IV. THE EFFECT OF U.S. NONCOMPLIANCE IN THE GAMBLING
DISPUTE ON THE LEGITIMACY OF GATS
"The best international agreement is not worth very much if its
obligations cannot be enforced when one of the signatories fails to
comply with such obligations." '129 The United States is just such a
signatory whose noncompliance could bring down the entire trade
in services agreement. A failure by the United States to conform to
the DSB's recommendations in the gambling dispute will be
detrimental to GATS for a variety of reasons.
First, GATS suffers from skepticism among member nations
regarding the strength of its provisions-a skepticism that cannot
be overcome by any precedent for service trade regulation. Next, the
United States was highly influential in the push for an agreement
on trade in services, 3 ' and, along with playing a role in the
development of GATS, the United States also helped shape the
dispute settlement framework that governs the agreement. 3'
U.S. failure to abide by its commitments to the agreement would
appear disingenuous and set a poor example for other GATS
members. In addition, the United States's attitude toward the
Panel's initial decision undermines the DSB's credibility in deciding
disputes under GATS. The United States lacks the typical reasons
for noncompliance that have been proffered to explain previous
instances of noncompliance. The inexplicable nature of U.S. non-
examples of U.S. noncompliance, the European Communities requested consultations as
recently as 2006. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United
States-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/1 (Oct. 3,
2006).
129. HANDBOOK ON WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 79, at 1.
130. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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compliance in the Antigua gambling dispute further emphasizes
that perhaps GATS members are unwilling to take this agreement
seriously. Finally, noncompliance in the Antigua dispute leaves the
United States open to further challenges to its gambling laws, which
could lead to repeated instances of noncompliance under GATS.
A. Fragility of GATS as a Mechanism for Regulating Trade in
Services
A negative response to a WTO decision under GATS by a powerful
WTO member nation, such as the United States, will be far more
detrimental than a similar response under other WTO agreements.
One of the greatest reasons that U.S. noncompliance in the gam-
bling dispute will have such a strong impact is that GATS is a much
younger agreement than GATT and is far less battle tested interna-
tionally.132 The WTO Ministerial Conferences have devoted rela-
tively little time and attention to the issue of trade in services.'33
GATS is already struggling to gain respect in the face of a problem
with overly flexible provisions that allow for fairly facile escape from
its relevant obligations.3
Additionally, very few cases thus far have complained exclusively
of violations under GATS.'35 The often cited examples of U.S.
noncompliance involved other agreements.'36 U.S. unresponsiveness
to Panel recommendations involving GATS may be more damaging,
therefore, than similar responses under GATT or other WTO agree-
ments.
For example, TRIPS, promulgated at the same time as GATS, has
suffered from similar dilemmas. Some scholars have worried that
the U.S. response in the Section 110(5) Copyright dispute, which
appears to advocate substituting compensation of victims for
compliance with obligations, may likewise undercut that agree-
132. See Vanessa P. Sciarra, The World Trade Organization: Services, Investment, and
Dispute Resolution, 32 INT'L LAW. 923, 923 (1998).
133. See Adlung, supra note 11, at 865.
134. Id. at 867.
135. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS:
Lessons from US-Gambling, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 319, 319-20 (2006).
136. See supra Part III.D.
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ment. 3 7 The precedent for international protection of intellectual
property, however, was already well established prior to promulga-
tion of TRIPS. TRIPS incorporated a prior convention governing
authors and composers of music and was accompanied by a number
of other older conventions as well.13 Thus, the fact that U.S.
noncompliance with a WTO decision under TRIPS, a comparable but
slightly more conventional agreement than GATS, may have such
a potentially negative impact on that agreement suggests that a
similar U.S. response under GATS will carry even more destructive
weight.
B. U.S. Influence on the Creation of GATS and the Current DSU
A further reason that U.S. noncompliance under GATS is
detrimental is that the United States played a key role in the
development of a multilateral agreement regarding the services
industry, and, because of this early leadership, failure to honor
its service sector commitments could undermine the agreement.
The United States was among the first countries to advocate for
the incorporation of a services agreement into the GATT. The
argument originated in the 1970s, and in 1982, the United States
made a formal proposal to include services at a GATT ministerial
meeting.139 GATS eventually took effect in January of 1995.140
U.S. influence also shaped the current framework for dispute
settlement in the WTO. This influence can be traced to a number of
factors. First, the United States played a large role in the writing of
the WTO treaty itself, which includes the current DSU.14 1 Further,
137. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 394
(2006) (stating that the U.S. response in U.S.-Section 110(5) "might undercut the minimum
standards of intellectual property protection under the TRIPS Agreement while creating
instability in the international trading system").
138. Kearston G. Everitt, Note, The Latin American Musician's "Life Would be Meaningless
Without Music" The Fight Against CD Piracy in Latin America, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 495, 512-
13 (2005).
139. Richard B. Self, General Agreement on Trade in Services, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 523, 523 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
140. Introduction to GATS, supra note 37.
141. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation: "Americanization" and Negotiation in
the Settlement of WTO Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 121, 121 (2003).
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as discussed above, the United States has been the primary player
in a majority of WTO disputes.'42 During the first ten years of its
existence, the United States participated in 62 percent of all panel
proceedings and 66 percent of all appellate proceedings. 143 Finally,
many of the lawyers participating in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings-as both representatives of member nations and as part
of the WTO bodies-received education or training through the U.S.
legal system.1 44 Thus, U.S. influence permeates into many aspects
of dispute settlement under GATS.
The influence the United States exerted over the passage of GATS
and its dispute settlement mechanism is another of the primary
reasons that an unfavorable U.S. response to decisions handed down
under the agreement could have such a damaging result. Because
the United States initially fought so vehemently for the adoption of
GATS and the DSU, other member nations could perceive these
actions as indicating that liberalized trade in services is important
enough for the United States to get involved and push through an
agreement, complete with a dispute settlement framework. At the
same time, the United States appears to have helped construct an
agreement that is binding on all members, except when the United
States decides otherwise.141 Member nations may identify such
actions as both contradictory and hypocritical.
C. U.S. Expression of Discontent with the Panel's Ruling
Another factor contributing to the fragility of GATS as a guaran-
tor of service sector commitments is the fact that the gambling
dispute is the first instance in which the United States has ever
declared publicly its intent to ignore the recommendations of a WTO
body. '4 Even in the most notorious instances of noncompliance,
142. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
143. See Wilson, supra note 84, at 22; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
144. Pauwelyn, supra note 141, at 121.
145. See Rose, supra note 6, at 227 ("The Clinton and Bush administrations spent years
convincing other countries to join and abide by [WTO] decisions. How would we feel if China
announced that it would not permit American carmakers to compete against its local
manufacturers, and then blew off a ruling against it by the WTOT').
146. See Magnus, supra note 63, at 249 ("[Slenior officials said the United States would not
even attempt to comply with an adverse ruling on US-Gambling along the lines laid out by the
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such as the Hot-Rolled Steel and Section 211 cases, the United
States at least expressed that its objective was to adhere to the
WTO's recommendations. 4 7 Although the United States was not
forced to make good on its threat in the gambling dispute, as the
recommendations of the Panel were largely overturned by the
Appellate Body, such blatant disregard for the authority of the
Panel sets a terrible example for other member nations. Further,
other member nations may perceive the reversal of the Appellate
Body as an example of U.S. attempts to strongarm the DSB into
ruling in its favor, further undermining the WTO as a guarantor of
service sector commitments.
Although the United States may appear to be justified in its
threat given that the Panel report was overturned, the lack of
deference to a legally binding judicial body is concerning. The
United States has never expressed an intent to disregard a ques-
tionable DSB ruling pertaining to any other WTO agreement,
suggesting that the United States takes perceived violations of
GATS less seriously than it does violations of its other multilateral
obligations. If other members decide that they too will not only fail
to comply with WTO recommendations, but also decline to make an
appearance of attempting compliance, the legitimacy of GATS will
be in jeopardy.
D. Lack of Recourse to the Usual Excuses for Noncompliance
The United States has compiled a regular grab bag of excuses for
its noncompliance with some of the more controversial WTO
decisions noted above. 4 ' Most of these excuses, however, fail to
apply to the gambling dispute as justification for the United States's
lack of responsiveness. The United States partially excused its
noncompliance in some of the earlier instances by pointing to the
fact that some of the disputes dealt with fundamental principles of
U.S. law and by indicating that making major changes to U.S.
legislation is a lengthy process.'49
lower panel.").
147. See supra Part III.D.2-3.
148. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
149. Magnus, supra note 63, at 244 & n.5.
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In the gambling dispute, however, no bills have been submitted
to Congress that even include a provision to address compliance. 5 '
Unlike in the Byrd Amendment and Hot-Rolled Steel cases, the
United States cannot appeal to the difficulty of a legislative fix as a
reason for noncompliance in this case. In fact, "with just a little
tweaking of the Interstate Horseracing Act, the United States would
be in complete compliance with its WTO treaty obligations.''
The United States also cannot rely on the excuse that it currently
lacks enough information to do an effective cost-benefit analysis of
the trade effects of reforming the offending measure, as it did in the
US-Section 211 Appropriation Act dispute. 5 2 Critics concerned
with the possible increase in gambling and its resulting ill effects on
public morals need not fear because, in this case, bringing the IHA
into compliance with WTO recommendations would have little effect
on gambling in the United States. As one scholar notes, even if
foreign operators were allowed to take U.S. horse racing bets,
bettors would be unlikely to risk their money with less-established
operators.' 53 Furthermore, the United States could either ban off-
track betting altogether, or it could allow foreign operators to take
bets subject to the strict regulations already in place. Because many
foreign operators fail to meet those regulations, they would be shut
out of the market, likely making the effects on gambling minimal.""
E. Vulnerability of the United States to Further Challenges Under
GATS
Finally, the United States may have placed itself in a position to
face further challenges from other nations intent on fostering the
growth of their respective gambling industries; such challenges
represent further opportunities to weaken the legitimacy of GATS.
One such country is the United Kingdom, which recently passed its
Gambling Act,' 55 providing for licenses to operate remote gambling
150. Rose, supra note 6, at 226-27.
151. Id. at 225.
152. See Magnus, supra note 63, at 247-48.
153. Rose, supra note 6, at 227.
154. Id.
155. Gambling Act, 2005, c. 19 (Eng.).
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sites that a Gambling Commission would regulate and evaluate. 5 '
The Act also provides extensive regulation to protect against crime,
addiction, and exploitation of minors, as well as to promote open
and fair gambling. 5 7 In its response to the initial proposal for
industry reforms in Great Britain, the government found that
Britain's gambling laws had "failed to keep pace with technology,"
and that gambling had "become part of the main stream of leisure
activity."'58 Although retaliatory trade sanctions from a small
country such as Antigua are not daunting to the United States, 59
the prospect of a similar trade dispute with Britain, a major trading
partner, is a far greater threat. The European Union and other
countries are also considering the possibility of liberalizing their
gambling regulations to permit Internet gambling. 6°
Additionally, because of a procedural error made by Antigua in
the Panel stage of the dispute, the Appellate Body declined to
scrutinize U.S. state laws for consistency with GATS obligations. 1
Should another member, such as Britain or the European Union,
later bring a similar case, U.S. domestic gambling laws will be on
the chopping block.
If these larger, more powerful GATS members decide to pursue
complaints against the United States with regard to its gambling
laws, this relatively minor act of noncompliance with regard to
Antigua's complaint could spiral into a glaring example of U.S.
noncooperation under GATS. This would force the United States
into an international dilemma: comply with the DSB and amend its
gambling laws, thereby admitting its error in the current dispute,
or fail to comply and seal the fate of GATS as an agreement devoid
of material significance.
156. See id. § 70.
157. See id. § 1.
158. DEP'T FOR CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, A SAFE BET FOR SUCCESS-MODERNISING
BRITAIN's GAMBLING LAWS, 1.2-.3 (2002), http://www.culture.gov.ukNR/rdonlyres/
E2667C96-B033-41B0-B027-8691B0232F5B/O/gamblingreportpgs.pdf.
159. See Rose, supra note 6, at 227 ("Although Antigua is busily granting new licenses and
will claim that it is losing billions of dollars, the payoff will be only in the tens of millions of
dollars.").
160. See Jeremy Hutto, What is Everybody Else Doing About It? A Foreign Jurisdictional
Analysis of Internet Gaming Regulation, 9 GAMING L. REV. 26 (2005).
161. Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, 149-55, 373(A)(iii).
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CONCLUSION
GATS has the potential to be one of the most important agree-
ments under the administration of the WTO. The international
trade in services has been growing at a rate much faster than that
of trade in goods over the past two decades.'62 A strong, multilateral
agreement in the services sector will increase security and predict-
ability in trading, strengthen the ability of weaker nations to
compete in the international services market, and also aid in the
growth of member nations' economies along the lines of comparative
advantage.'63 Yet, GATS is in danger, with the threat coming from
one of its major proponents and signatories: the United States.
The U.S. response to the DSB recommendations jeopardizes the
legitimacy of GATS as a mechanism for regulating services disputes.
The United States has not lived up to its end of the bargain with
regard to its GATS obligations, with this failure made weightier by
the fact that the country was responsible in large part for the
creation of the agreement in the first place. Although concerns
about national sovereignty admittedly must accompany a multilat-
eral agreement such as GATS, the agreement is structured in such
a way that the United States could have protected its gambling laws
if it so chose. Yet, it did not, and once a commitment is made to
liberalize a particular sector, that commitment ought to be honored.
The United States could have fixed this problem early by simply
amending or repealing the Interstate Horseracing Act. This Act was
neither as difficult to change nor as fundamental as much of the
other legislation that has been the subject of a WTO dispute. By
failing to comply, the United States has made both itself and the
agreement vulnerable as a legitimate mechanism for regulation of
trade. An early precedent has been set for noncompliance under
GATS, and, if the United States hopes to benefit from liberalization
of the service trade in the future, this is indeed a dangerous
precedent.
To avoid detrimental effects on such an important multilateral
trade agreement, the United States should take the steps necessary
162. See Introduction to GATS, supra note 37, § 1.1.
163. See supra Part III.A.
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to comply with the WTO recommendations in the gambling dispute.
Compliance would not require major adjustments to any current
federal gambling regulations, and, in reality, would likely have little
effect on domestic gambling."' Yet, though the costs of compliance
would be very little to the United States, the benefits are clearly
great. To realize these benefits, the United States should do its part
to protect the agreement that protects trade in services.
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